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Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse
Frank H. Easterbrookt
When he was dean of this law school, Gerhard Casper was
proud that the University of Chicago did not offer a course in
"The Law of the Horse." He did not mean by this that Illinois
specializes in grain rather than livestock. His point, rather, was
that "Law and . . . " courses should be limited to subjects that
could illuminate the entire law. Instead of offering courses suited
to dilettantes,' the University of Chicago offered courses in Law
and Economics, and Law and Literature, taught by people who
could be appointed to the world's top economics and literature
departments-even win the Nobel Prize in economics, as Ronald
Coase has done.
I regret to report that no one at this Symposium is going to
win a Nobel Prize any time soon for advances in computer sci-
ence. We are at risk of multidisciplinary dilettantism, or, as one
of my mentors called it, the cross-sterilization of ideas. Put
together two fields about which you know little and get the worst
of both worlds. Well, let me be modest. I am at risk of dilettan-
tism, and I suspect that I am not alone. Beliefs lawyers hold
about computers, and predictions they make about new technolo-
gy, are highly likely to be false. This should make us hesitate to
prescribe legal adaptations for cyberspace. The blind are not good
trailblazers.
Dean Casper's remark had a second meaning-that the best
way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to
study general rules. Lots of cases deal with sales of horses;
others deal with people kicked by horses; still more deal with the
licensing and racing of horses, or with the care veterinarians give
to horses, or with prizes at horse shows. Any effort to collect
these strands into a course on "The Law of the Horse" is doomed
to be shallow and to miss unifying principles. Teaching 100
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
The Law School, The University of Chicago. Copyright rights to this Article are with the
author.
"[Olne finds more than a few courses in law schools entitled 'Law and _' in
which the blank is indeed intellectually blank." Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, Re-
tirement of Sheldon Messinger, 80 Cal L Rev 310 (1992).
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percent of the cases on people kicked by horses will not convey
the law of torts very well. Far better for most students-better,
even, for those who plan to go into the horse trade-to take
courses in property, torts, commercial transactions, and the like,
adding to the diet of horse cases a smattering of transactions in
cucumbers, cats, coal, and cribs. Only by putting the law of the
horse in the context of broader rules about commercial endeavors
could one really understand the law about horses.
Now you can see the meaning of my title. When asked to
talk about "Property in Cyberspace," my immediate reaction was,
"Isn't this just the law of the horse?" I don't know much about
cyberspace; what I do know will be outdated in five years (if not
five months!); and my predictions about the direction of change
are worthless, making any effort to tailor the law to the subject
futile. And if I did know something about computer networks, all
I could do in discussing "Property in Cyberspace" would be to
isolate the subject from the rest of the law of intellectual prop-
erty, making the assessment weaker.
This leads directly to my principal conclusion: Develop a
sound law of intellectual property, then apply it to computer
networks. Problem: we do not know whether many features of
existing law are optimal. Why seventeen years for patents, a
lifetime plus some for copyrights, and forever for trademarks?
Should these rights be strengthened or weakened?2 Why does
copyright have the particular form it does? What sense can one
make of the fuzzball factors for fair use? How can one make
these rights more precise, and therefore facilitate Coasean bar-
gains? Until we have answers to these questions, we cannot issue
prescriptions for applications to computer networks.
Cyberspace reduces the effective cost of copying. This contin-
ues a trend that began when Gutenberg invented movable type
and gave rise to political demand for what has become copyright
law. Yet how can we tackle the question whether copying has
become too easy, and therefore should be met by countervailing
changes, when we have not solved the problems posed by
yesterday's technology? Consider the plain-paper photocopier.
People can run off scholarly articles. To what extent may re-
searchers copy articles from increasingly expensive journals to
create a stockpile for their own future endeavors? This is a
2 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325 (1989).
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question about fair use; yet the fair-use criteria are so ambulato-
ry that no one can give a general answer.
Just recently the Second Circuit held that copying for re-
search within a for-profit corporation exceeded the bounds of fair
use.3 The panel was divided; another circuit is to the contrary,
and the Supreme Court split 4 to 4 when reviewing that deci-
sion.4 Both opinions leave the impression that a dime's worth of
difference in the facts would alter the outcome. Lack of certainty
in the property right makes protection of intellectual property all
but impossible.
The Copyright Clearance Center barely raises enough money
to cover the costs of its operations. When you copy something
with a CCC slug line at the bottom, which directs you to remit
50¢ per page to a particular account number, do you do it? No,
you don't, because the extent of the fair-use privilege is so hard
to grasp, and because remitting would be such a bother-do you
tape two quarters to a post card and mail it?
When property rights are poorly specified, it is hard to trans-
act about them, and correspondingly hard to promote the process
of transaction that allocates resources to their highest valued
uses. Instead we see second-best moves. Illustration: the price of
academic journals has gone through the roof. Library subscrip-
tions often exceed $500 per year; for some scientific or medical
journals, the price exceeds $2,000. This high price is an advance
fee for photocopying, and it may be that this way the authors
(and publishers) get total revenues as high as they would collect
if they could charge for reprints, or if they sold more journals at
lower prices.5 The high-price-journal, cheap-copy approach not
only cuts the costs of transactions (no one has to collect or remit
copy fees), but also cuts the marginal cost of using intellectual
property. Because intellectual property can be used without being
used up, the ideal pricing mechanism is a flat fee, with no mar-
ginal cost for use.
The blanket license for the right to play music approximates
this ideal two-part price. But the blanket license works because
American Geophysical Union v Texaco, Inc., 60 F3d 913 (2d Cir 1995). See also Wil-
liam Patry, American Geophysical Union v Texaco, Inc.: Copyright and Corporate Photo-
copying, 61 Brooklyn L Rev 429 (1995).
' Williams & Wilkins Co. v United States, 487 F2d 1345 (Ct Cl 1973), affd by an
equally divided Court, 420 US 376 (1975).
' See S. J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, 8 Re-
search in Law & Economics 181 (1986).
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the rights for public performance of music are very well specified.
Not so for copying articles.
The high subscription fee for libraries does poorly at one of
the critical ingredients of the blanket license: price discrimina-
tion. ASCAP and BMI charge by a radio station's revenues, or a
licensee's gross receipts. The University of Chicago pays more for
its ASCAP license than does Swarthmore College. But the Jour-
nal of Financial Economics demands the same $750 per year
from Goldman Sachs, a business school, or a law school; it cannot
discriminate as effectively as ASCAP does. So Goldman Sachs
pays too little for the value received, and the University of Chica-
go Law School has just dropped its subscription. The pricing
mechanism has not worked well, because of the difficulties in
defining the property rights.
If we are so far behind in matching law to a well-understood
technology such as photocopiers-if we have not even managed to
create well-defined property rights so that people can adapt their
own conduct to maximize total wealth-what chance do we have
for a technology such as computers that is mutating faster than
the virus in The Andromeda Strain?
Well, then, what can we do? By and large, nothing. If you
don't know what is best, let people make their own arrange-
ments.
Next after nothing is: keep doing what you have been doing.
Most behavior in cyberspace is easy to classify under current
property principles. What people freely make available is freely
copyable. When people attach strings, they must be respected,
and the tough question when someone copies commercial soft-
ware will be whether the person making copies is a direct in-
fringer or only a contributory infringer, and whether the remedy
should be civil damages or time in prison. Lower costs of copying
may make violations of the law more attractive, which suggests
the allocation of additional prosecutorial resources, but move-
ment along a cost continuum does not call for change in legal
substance.
What else is there to do? I offer three themes.
1. Make rules clearer, to promote bargains. "We" don't know
what is best, but in a Coasean world the affected parties will by
their actions establish what is best.
The federal government's Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights recently issued a report called Intellectual Prop-
erty and the National Information Infrastructure. In addition to
the pompous title and the standard drumbeat of calls for more
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studies, this report contains a few concrete proposals. One, which
I gather is controversial, is to amend the Copyright Act to beef
up the distribution right.' The Working Group recommends that
the law recognize that dissemination of copyrighted works via
electronic transmission is one of the rights the copyright propri-
etor possesses.
One may say in response that this change gives too much to
the copyright proprietor or restricts unduly the ability to dissemi-
nate works. Some people believe that copyright proprietors
should be delighted to have a throng willing to transmit their
works to consumers who will pay royalties for them (as a recipi-
ent clearly must do--for they get a copy whether or not a trans-
mission is a "distribution" of the work). Perhaps so; but if this is
so, the author or owner will permit the transmission, just as *song
writers license the transmission of their works over the radio to
people who may choose to turn on their tape recorders. An author
could give this permission at large, while retaining the right to
charge for the keeping of copies.
Simply put, it is awfully hard to know what the optimal
compensation package for authors is, unless the property rights
are clear. If something about the nature of cyberspace has made
application of the distribution right cloudy, then by all means
clear it up again, so that people may make their own arrange-
ments. And on balance it is best to give these rights to authors.
Why? Because if the best arrangement turns out to be free distri-
bution, then private transactions may produce this result when
the statute assigns the rights to authors; but if the best arrange-
ment turns out to be some fee for distribution and a lower price
for copying, it is extremely hard to reach this state of affairs if
the statute cancels the distribution right. Private transactions
could shift the right back to authors only if the parties have
contractual relations (for example, patrons of the opera may
agree not to tape the performances). We must bear in mind the
high possibility of error in the original specification of
entitlements-a risk especially high in a legislative world domi-
nated by interest-group politics. (The copy law contains a special
provision for agricultural fairs and exhibitions, still another allu-
sion to the law of the horse!) The risk of error should lead to
initial assignments that are easy to reverse, so that people may
find their own way with the least interference.
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure 193 (1995) ("Working Group Report").
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2. Create property rights, where now there are none-again
to make bargains possible.
Property rights in domain names is an example of what I
have in mind. Until recently, domain names on the Internet were
assigned by the government (rather, by a firm under contract to
do the government's bidding). Allocation was first-come, first-
served, with no effort to purge unused names. That led to people
storing up domain names. Intellectual-property law rightly has
been hostile to such maneuvers. Domain names have some of the
attributes of trademarks; but one can't get a trademark by just
filing. A firm must use a mark to obtain rights in it; must use the
mark continuously; and once this occurs, latecomers stand behind
it in line. Similarly, corporate names are registered with the
states, and new arrivals cannot duplicate existing names.
The allocation of domain names is now in private hands, and
the $50 annual fee will abate the snatch-and-grab incentive to a
limited degree. But the allocation of names remains first-come,
first-served, with the result that people lay claims to famous
corporate and political names. Today you can point your browser
to www.clinton96.org and find, not the home page for the Clinton
reelection campaign, but a satire of that campaign, with a big
picture of the President holding up one finger and a caption
claiming that he has a single accomplishment--election. Dick
Tuck has come to cyberspace. This is nonpartisan harassment:
www.dole96.org also is a satire page.
Property rights need to be better specified than that. Appro-
priation of names and trademarks would not be tolerated in the
rest of the commercial or political world; why so for Internet
addresses? In other words, we need to bring the Internet into the
world of property law. I grant that, with search facilities, you can
find the American Broadcasting Corporation even if someone else
has www.abc.com. Nodes are in the end numbers, and conversion
to letters is arbitrary. But the search process is costly and can be
avoided by correct allocation in the first place.
By "correct" allocation I certainly do not mean allocation
according to some government formula. We have tried that ap-
proach with broadcast licenses, and it has failed. Indeed, even in
the world of over-the-air communications, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission has moved in the direction Ronald Coase and
Leo Herzel pointed in the 1950s: sell frequencies at auctions.7 So
R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J L & Econ 1 (1950);
Comment, Leo Herzel, 'Public Interest" and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18
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it can be with domain names. Let people bid for symbols, then
sell them in a developed aftermarket. Perhaps initial allocations
could be made by corporate names or product trademarks. De-
tails are far less important than the principle that it is important
to establish property rights, without which welfare-increasing
bargains cannot occur.
That the Internet spans the world means some difficulty in
defining property rights in names; many jurisdictions may have
different ideas about optimal allocations. But the telephone sys-
tem spans many legal regimes without duplication of numbers.
International disagreements about patent or copyright laws are
much more complex than those necessary to establish domain
names.
Some other nations are jittery about the fact that no one
owns or runs the Internet; it is a web of little, autonomous nets.
But no one can regulate the whole process of information ex-
change, and even those who hate the idea of free communication
have little choice but to join on the terms the participants are
willing to accept. China must follow the international consensus
if it wants access to other nodes.
3. Create bargaining institutions.
Computers offer many opportunities to do, at next to no cost,
the sort of thing the Copyright Clearance Center has tried and
failed to do for photocopies. Consider, for example, the question
whether a publisher of content on the Internet wants to autho-
rize the making of copies and, if so, the making of copies that can
be recopied, or a single copy for use on a local computer. Or does
the publisher only want to authorize viewing on screen? All are
logical possibilities, each rational for some authors, or for any
given author at different times. How is it possible to specify.
which is which, and to collect payment?-especially in a world
where Netscape Navigator is making cache copies behind
everyone's back and turning all of you into persistent infringers!
The answer, it seems to me, is a convention-a protocol un-
der which each file contains its own instructions on this question,
and programs know how to interpret them. You are familiar with
such conventions. When your modem calls a remote modem, the
two devices engage in elaborate interrogation to discover what
speed to use and what compression and error-correction algo-
rithms are in place. An international standards-setting organiza-
tion agreed on the language; private firms all over the world
U Chi L Rev 802 (1951).
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have decided whether, and to what extent, to use this agreed
language for communications. Some firms have come up with
their own extensions, outside the organization's framework. En-
cryption technology is similar. You may notice that when
Netscape enters a particular corner of the web, a solid key ap-
pears in the lower left of the screen; this shows that the client
and the server have agreed on an encryption protocol, securing
the session.
There are several available protocols.' So can it be with
copying. A standards-setting organization could prescribe, say,
twenty different copying rules-sets of permission and payment
terms. There could be competing organizations, with their own
standards. Each Internet server and client would understand
these terms and carry out the negotiation automatically, remit-
ting any payment to an agreed depository by secure methods.
In raising this possibility, I have in mind still a third mean-
ing of the Law of the Horse. Gerhard Casper did not originate
that phrase. It comes from Karl Llewellyn. When he was begin-
ning the project that led to the Uniform Commercial Code, he
contrasted the rules for trade between merchants with the rules
for idiosyncratic transactions between amateurs, which he called
the law of the horse Why hitch professionals to a wagon de-
signed for amateurs? Llewellyn's idea, realized in the UCC, was
to give merchants a menu of options from which they could
choose at low cost. One option would be the presumptive rule,
applied unless the merchants said otherwise.
The Working Group expresses some concern that courts
would balk at enforcing such "contracts of adhesion,"' ° but re-
cent cases show that the concern is unjustified." There is no
reason to distinguish contract terms from any other aspect of a
product's composition. A buyer of a computer does not control the
quality of the circuits; the seller arranges both product attributes
and contract terms. Just as no one would think of saying that the
buyer of a computer with a 500 MB disk really is "entitled" to a
The process can be automatic and secure. Netscape's security methods are simple
compared with those used at MIT, which, despite the greatest concentration of bright
hackers on the planet, has never had a security breach. See Jeffrey I. Schiller, Secure Dis-
tributed Computing, 271 Scientific American 66 (Nov 1994).
' Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 Harv L Rev 725, 735, 737 (1939);
Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 Harv L Rev 873 (1939).
o See, for example, Working Group Report at 49-50 (cited in note 6).
See, for example, Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S Ct
2322 (1995); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v Shute, 499 US 585 (1991).
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750 MB disk, or a faster disk, on the ground that disk size and
speed is a "contract of adhesion," so it is foolish to complain
about contract terms. These all are mediated by price. "Better"
terms (as buyers see things) support higher prices, and sellers
have as much reason to offer the terms consumers prefer (that is,
the terms that consumers find cost-justified) as to offer any other
ingredient of their products. It is essential to enforce these terms
if markets are to work.
Repeated transactions in thick markets. That's what copying
is on computer networks. Just as computers lower the cost of
copying, so they expand the size and thickness of the market,
and lower the cost of transacting in intellectual property, for both
negotiation and payment can be done automatically once authors
and users decide what terms they will accept. People tend to
emphasize the effect on copying costs and disregard the effects on
the size of the market and the costs of transactions; yet just as
lower costs of copying pose a challenge to authors, the lower costs
of transacting may represent the solution. Computers now match
all trades on the London Stock Exchange; they can match trades
in a virtual intellectual-property auction place. Work is under
way to revise Article 2 of the UCC to supply more standard, off-
the-rack rules for computer software. 12 I trust that the authors
will resist the temptation to limit the range of allowable choices,
rather than to write a menu containing the most popular mor-
sels. The plan can be extended to intellectual property, either by
listing options in the statute or through a private standards-
setting effort.
To make this work, the author's instructions about dissemi-
nation and payment must remain with the copy. The Working
Group recommends a new statute to prevent tampering with
copyright protection and management systems."3 This proposal
may or may not be right in the details, but it is not clear to me
that any change is necessary. Excising any part of the intellectu-
al property likely creates a derivative work, which itself is a sub-
ject of control under current law. This is not the time or place to
get into details, however.
A quick summary: Error in legislation is common, and never
more so than when the technology is galloping forward. Let us
not struggle to match an imperfect legal system to an evolving
world that we understand poorly. Let us instead do what is es-
12 See Working Group Report at 53 (cited in note 6).
" Id at 212-213 (analysis), App I 5-12 (draft legislation).
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sential to permit the participants in this evolving world to make
their own decisions. That means three things: make rules clear;
create property rights where now there are none; and facilitate
the formation of bargaining institutions. Then let the world of
cyberspace evolve as it will, and enjoy the benefits.
